Klaviyo Q4 2025: Product Pivot Meets Enterprise Expansion

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Klaviyo’s earnings results kicked off the earnings season for my cohort and my 5th year of this blog. Between double-digit revenue growth, SMS-driven cross-sell, the introduction of the SMS+ market segment, and the first earnings call with two CEOs, there’s a lot to unpack here.

The company has long been the industry’s Rule of 40 poster child. But look past the $1.2B revenue headline and you’ll see a company re-engineering its DNA. They aren’t just an email box anymore. They’re trying to become the headless brain of the enterprise.

The Good

FY 2025 revenue was $1.234B, up 32% YoY. Q4 revenue was $350M, up 30% YoY. The non-GAAP operating margin was 14% for the year and 15% in Q4. Q4 free cash flow was $87M, up 61% YoY. Klaviyo ended the year with over $1B in cash.

Cross-sell works

I’ve long been a skeptic of cross-selling because few companies actually get it right. However, based on the metrics, Klaviyo has figured out the flywheel.

NRR re-accelerated to 110%, driven by growth across email and SMS first, then cross-selling into SMS and newer products. 60% of ARR comes from multi-product customers, and over 15% of ARR comes from customers using at least three products.

Sustained mid-market and enterprise growth

Customers with over $50K ARR grew 37% YoY to 3,912, and net adds of 349 in the quarter were a record. Q4 revenue outside the Americas grew 41% YoY, and they called full-year international growth at 42%.

The enterprise posture also became more concrete. Accenture changes the enterprise motion. It implies bigger deal sizes, longer cycles, and more implementation work, but also more standardization and more durable multi-product adoption if they get it right. Here, product-led growth meets white-glove implementation.

The Interesting

Klaviyo is leaning hard into agents as the next interface. They are pitching an autonomous B2C CRM where agents sit on top of a real-time customer data plane and an execution plane.

They also keep tightening the channel posture. SMS is a volume driver today. Internationally, WhatsApp is driving adoption. RCS gets a favorable mention as well.

On GTM, the enterprise posture is becoming more deliberate and more aggressive. Chano is being positioned as the operator to scale that motion, and Accenture is being positioned as the mechanism to move more quickly inside large accounts where implementation and workflow redesign are part of the buy. See sidebar about the split of CEO responsibilities.

The Unknown

SMB health is unknown. Using Klaviyo’s GMV segmentation, SMB is 100k–20M GMV, mid-market is 20M–400M GMV, and enterprise is 400M+ GMV. SMB+ is an informal label for the upper end of SMB plus the lower mid-market, basically merchants near or above 20M GMV. The call does not give segment-level growth, churn, net adds, or SMB NRR, so we’re left inferring from higher-level momentum.

If the true SMB cohort is dealing with acquisition friction and rising costs, the headless brain vision could be too complex, and too expensive, for the customers who put Klaviyo on the map. That is a risk, and it is not directly answered by management.

FY 2026 revenue guide is $1.501B to $1.509B, implying 21.5% to 22.5% YoY growth. The guidance stays healthy, but the double-digit step-down cannot be waved away. 

RCS is directionally important to their channel story, but they did not give concrete adoption metrics or a quantified contribution expectation. The mention signals momentum, but the measurement is still to come.

Partnering with Accenture is a massive validator, but it can also be a speed killer. This is my read, not theirs. 

Klaviyo built its empire on self-serve adoption. A GSI-led motion is the antithesis of product-led sales: longer cycles, heavier implementation. And procurement hell is real. 

If enterprise becomes the only growth engine, Klaviyo risks losing the high-velocity PLG DNA that investors pay a premium for.

The autonomous CRM vision is compelling, but the 2026 guide embeds minimal contribution from these new AI agents. They are selling a future of autonomous marketing while the revenue is still being carried by the workhorses of email and SMS. Until we see agents show up in the expansion math, it’s still a developing story.

Sidebar: The CEO As CPO

A founder’s superpower is intuition: an instinctive awareness of the market and a deep understanding of the problem, both honed by years of hard-earned lessons. But with AI taking a wrecking ball to product roadmaps every three months, founder-CEOs are realizing they must actively drive the product organization to survive. Defending the “why” is a full-time job. Especially when the competition is just one vibe-code session away from stealing your lunch.

Andrew Bialecki’s move to hand off GTM to Chano Fernandez mirrors leaders like Satya Nadella who split responsibilities to stay focused on the core vision. Even Sergey Brin had to jump back into code commits to fire up Google’s AI engine. In the AI era, the corner office isn’t immune to the shift; if the CEO isn’t also the CPO, the roadmap is at risk. Not every CEO can do that well, but the ones who can are going to compound an already compounding advantage.

Finally

Jeremy Irons’ character in Margin Call, in a masterclass on acting and a sharp depiction of a competent CEO, says he gets paid the big bucks for one thing: to know when the music is going to stop.

Klaviyo’s leadership team seems attuned to the music, and they’re changing the dance steps with every shift in the beat.

The product strategy is clear: agents as the interface, and richer rails with WhatsApp now and RCS as the next step in their story. The enterprise push is real. If Accenture delivers, it changes how Klaviyo gets bought.